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Abstract
Cancellable biometrics (CB) intentionally distorts bio-
metric template for security protection, and simultaneously
preserving the distance/similarity for matching in the trans-
formed domain. Despite its effectiveness, the security issues
attributed to similarity preservation property of CB is un-
derestimated. Dong et al. [BTAS’19], exploited the similar-
ity preservation trait of CB and proposed a similarity-based
attack with high successful attack rate. The similarity-based
attack utilizes preimage that generated from the protected
biometric template for impersonation and perform cross
matching. In this paper, we propose a constrained opti-
mization similarity-based attack (CSA), which is improved
upon Dong’s genetic algorithm enabled similarity-based at-
tack (GASA). The CSA applies algorithm-specific equality
or inequality relations as constraints, to optimize preim-
age generation. We justify the effectiveness of CSA from the
supervised learning perspective. We conduct extensive ex-
periments to demonstrate CSA against Index-of-Max (IoM)
hashing with LFW face dataset. The results suggest that
CSA is effective to breach IoM hashing security, and outper-
forms GASA remarkably. Furthermore, we reveal the cor-
relation of IoM hash code size and the attack performance
of CSA.
1. Introduction
In the past decade, biometric technology has been widely
deployed for identity management systems due to its usabil-
ity. The proliferation of centralized biometric databases is
therefore inevitable. However, if the biometric databases
are compromised, the security of biometric template and
privacy are of concerned by public. Cancelable biomet-
rics (CB) is devised to protect the biometric template. CB
employs a parameterized, renewable, and irreversible but
similarity preserving transformation to convert a biometric
template into a protected instance. Due to the property of
similarity preservation, templates matching can be done in
the transformed domain while prohibiting the matching of
templates between original and its transformed version [1].
Since CB was introduced, a large number of methods have
been reported. Some representative instances are BioHash-
ing [2], bloom filter [3], and Index-of-Max (IoM) hashing
[4]. Ideally, the following four requirements should be sat-
isfied by any CB scheme:
• Non-invertibility or Irreversibility: It should be com-
putationally hard to retrieve original biometric features
from a single or multiple compromised templates, even
under the case where the transformation parameters
e.g. token are known. Hence, compromise of protected
templates will not lead to the privacy invasion.
• Revocability or Renewability: It should be feasible to
re-issue a new protected template when the old one
is compromised. Other protected templates should re-
main no impact when the replacement is carried out.
• Non-linkability or Unlinkability: It is impossible to
perform cross matching among multiple protected
templates across various applications. When one
or multiple protected biometric templates have been
stolen, the templates that derived from the same iden-
tity that stored in other databases should not be traced.
• Performance preservation: The accuracy performance
should not be degraded significantly after transforma-
tion. To meet this criterion, the CB scheme has to
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
13
05
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
3 J
un
 20
20
satisfy the similarity preservation property where the
pair-wise distance of templates before and after trans-
formation should be largely preserved.
Despite CB has been proved useful, it is vulnerable to
various attacks. Firstly, CB could be attacked by attack via
record multiplicity (ARM) (also known correlation attack)
[5], which leads to the violation of the unlinkability criteria.
The ARM refers to the case when multiple protected tem-
plates are stolen, then attackers may correlate those tem-
plates that generated from the same user for cross match-
ing and/or for template generation. Secondly, CB could
be harmed by dictionary based attack [6] and brute force
[7] attack, which result in violating the irreversibility cri-
teria. Our focus in this paper is similarity attack (SA) or
also known as pre-image attack [8]. Similarity attack ex-
ploits the similarity preserving property of CB to generate a
pre-image from the protected template for impersonation as
well as cross-match with the templates in various applica-
tions. The pre-image is an instance despite not close to the
original template, it is highly much alike to the transformed
template. Therefore, SA is harmful to both unlinkability
and irreversibility.
SA attack has been explored earlier in the literature.
Most of the work focus on SA against BioHashing assum-
ing its parameter (secret token) is known [1]. Despite a
few proposals such as simple data dimension reduction and
permutation, attempted to rectify this issue [9], vulnera-
bility to SA remains critical [8, 10]. Most of the existing
SA schemes, such as Genetic algorithm enabled similarity-
based attack (GASA) solely exploit similarity preserving
property of CB to launch the attack [10, 11]. However,
for some CB schemes, besides distance similarity, some
other information can be learned from the protected tem-
plates. For instance, in IoM hashing, a set of inequalities
can be established from each individual hash code [4, 12].
We prove in section 4.3 that when these inequalities are uti-
lized as constraints to compute a preimage, the discrepancy
between the two protected templates that transformed from
the preimage and from the original biometric template can
be eliminated.
In this paper, we propose an attack method called
constrained-optimized similarity-based attack (CSA). CSA
is built upon the GASA [10] with augmented algorithm-
specific equality or inequality relations as constraints. The
attempt to seek an optimal preimage can be perceived as
a form of supervised learning problem (section 3.2) where
the constraints are leveraged to narrow down the search-
ing space of an optimization algorithm. With better preim-
age quality, the successful attack rate can be elevated re-
markably. Since preimage generation is based on the su-
pervised learning approach, overfitting is inevitable. We
demonstrate that by enlarging the hash code size, the over-
fitting problem can be alleviated. With large hash code size,
the effectiveness of CSA over GASA is observed. We con-
duct the experiments to assess the security of IoM hash-
ing under LFW dataset via CSA. We share our code at
https://github.com/azrealwang/csa.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a constrained optimization based similar-
ity attack for IoM hashing, namely CSA.
• We analyze preimage generation problem from the su-
pervised learning perspective, which can justify why
CSA outperforms GASA significantly.
• We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate
CSA against IoM hashing with LFW face dataset. We
reveal the size of the IoM hash code is one of the key
factors to impact attack performance. We also discuss
the implication of CSA on security, parameters setting
and efficiency with respect to the attack performance.
2. Related work
2.1. Similarity-based attack (SA)
There are several SA schemes proposed in the litera-
ture. Dong et al. [10] and Lacharme et al. [11] propose a
SA scheme using genetic algorithm (GA). The GA-enabled
SA generates preimage with an iterative procedure of se-
lection, mutation and crossover. The experimental results
attest that GA-enabled SA is effective to breach Biohashing
based cancellable face and fingerprint templates.
Feng et al. [13] propose a SA scheme based on neural
networks. Feng et al. claim that there are several limitations
in many SA schemes such that: 1) They rely on less-realistic
assumptions, 2) They rely on knowledge of e.g. transfor-
mation algorithm and its parameters. Hence, Feng et al.
consider two distinct scenarios depend on the availability
of transformation algorithm knowledge. With that knowl-
edge, the attack can be launched for preimage generation.
If transformation algorithm knowledge is not available, the
attack also can be launched by using a multilayer perceptron
network and a customized hill climbing [14, 15].
Kaplan et al. [16] propose a SA scheme by utilizing
the relation of multiple compromised transformed templates
from the same individual. The scheme exploits distance
preserving trait of the transformation algorithm. However,
Kaplan’s scheme does not apply to the systems that only
store one single protected template of each user .
Ghammam et al. [17] propose a constrained optimiza-
tion SA against IoM hashing. The method applies inequal-
ities as constraints to seek preimage solution. However,
this method only addresses the applicability to IoM hashing
based binary template specifically. Moreover, the experi-
ment results do not demonstrate its effectiveness when the
user-specific parameter is re-issued.
2.2. IoM hashing
In this paper, we demonstrate our SA scheme against
IoM hashing as a case study. In this subsection, we intro-
duce the algorithm of the IoM hashing briefly.
The IoM hashing is a ranking-based locality sensitive
hashing method designed for biometric template protection.
The IoM hashing transforms a biometric template into a set
of top ranked discrete indices of random subspace projec-
tion as hash code [4]. Firstly, biometric feature x ∈ RN is
extracted from the biometric data. A set of random matri-
ces Rl ∈ RK×N , l = 1, ..., L, where L is the hash code size
and K is the subspace dimension, are drawn from a stan-
dard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). Hence, each random
projected vector zl ∈ RK can be computed as:
zl = Rlx. (1)
For each zl, the hash code hl ∈ [1,K] can be obtained from
the first ranked index of vector zl. The IoM hash vector is
then formed as h = {hl|l = 1, ..., L}. At verification stage,
for an query biometric features y, the hamming distance is
calculated between h(x) and h(y) [18] and decision can be
made by comparing the hamming score with respect to a
pre-determined threshold value.
3. Constrained-optimized similarity-based at-
tack (CSA)
In this section, the proposed CSA is presented. We be-
gin with a background introduction of similarity-based at-
tack in section 3.1. Then, we address the loss function
that we use to optimize the preimage search in section 3.2.
Then we reveal the preimage generation with the proposed
constrained optimization technique can be analyzed from
the supervised learning perspective in section 3.3. There-
after, as a toy example, IoM hashing is used to evaluate the
CSA, particularly, the inequality constraints of IoM hash-
ing is presented in section 3.4. A preimage generation algo-
rithm, namely Augmented Lagrangian Genetic Algorithm
(ALGA) is given in section 3.5.
3.1. Similarity-based attack (SA) framework
A given CB transformation function f(·) could be de-
fined as
y = f(x). (2)
where x represents the biometric template and y represents
protected template.
Ultimately, the aim of SA is to generate a preimage xˆ
[19] of y. Thus, SA is intuitively an optimization task to
search optimal xˆ:
argmin
xˆ
‖x− xˆ‖. (3)
In a CB system, x is discarded after transformation, how-
ever, the transformed templates y are stored. In order to
preserve matching accuracy, the relative distances between
y and yˆ = f(xˆ) are to be preserved. Thus, e.q. 3 can be
reformulated to
argmin
xˆ
D(y, yˆ), (4)
where D(·) is an algorithm-specific distance function.
3.2. Loss function
The preimage generation that required by CSA can be
perceived as a supervised learning problem, where the goal
is to learn optimal preimage by utilizing labeled data as
a supervising signal. Note that in CSA context, learn-
ing/training refers to the preimage generation but not to
model training under conventional supervised learning set-
ting. In supervised learning, a training data set X, Y is to
be availed where X is input data and Y is the label of X.
In our context, f(X) in eq. (2) can be seen as a predicted
label. Based on eq. 2 and eq. 4, the loss function of CSA
preimage generation L(·) is defined as
L = D(Y, f(X)). (5)
where D(·) is an algorithm-specific distance function.
However, the specific problem we discussed in this paper
is the SA on IoM hashing. Hence, biometric template x is
unknown as it is discarded after transformation, while user-
specific matrix R∗ = {R∗l }Ll=1 and the protected template
h = {hl}Ll=1 are available as they are stored in the database.
Recall hl is the index value of maximum entry of R∗l x (IoM
hash code) and L is the hash code size of IoM hashing. The
optimal preimage xˆ is the target of searching. Furthermore,
for each R∗l x, there is a corresponding ”label”, i.e. hl from
supervised learning perspective. As R∗l is known and x is
unknown, the X, Y in eq. 5 can be defined as
X = R∗ = {R∗l }Ll=1;
Y = h = {hl}Ll=1.
(6)
Therefore, there areL pairs of {(R∗l , hl)}Ll=1 can be formed.
Finally, the loss function in eq. 5 can be reformulated as:
L(xˆ) = D(h, f(R∗)), (7)
3.3. Constrained optimization
In this subsection, we justify the rational why CSA can
achieve superior attack performance.
Let h = f(x;R∗) and hˆ = f(xˆ;R∗) be the IoM hash vec-
tor that generated from biometric template x and its coun-
terpart that generated from pre-image xˆ during ”training”
stage. Then suppose h′ = f(x;R∗
′
) and hˆ
′
= f(xˆ;R∗
′
)
are the IoM hash vectors for verification where R∗′ is a new
user-specific random matrix for h′ and hˆ
′
(R∗′ 6= R∗). For
the sake of clarity, we define several terms:
• Definition 1: Test error (TEE), or prediction error,
refers to the deviation of true h′ and predicted hˆ
′
from
testing data. It is used to estimate the attack perfor-
mance of unseen data. As they are integer vectors,
TEE can be computed with
TEE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[D(h′i, hˆ
′
i)]
2. (8)
where D(·) here is the hamming distance and n is the
repetitive verification times. In our experiment, we set
n = 10 (section 4.2). h′i and hˆ
′
i are generated by dif-
ferent R∗′ for each verification.
• Definition 2: Training error (TRE) refers to the devia-
tion of true h and predicted hˆ [20]. Similarly, TRE can
be computed with:
TRE = [D(h, hˆ)]2. (9)
• Definition 3: Variance (VAR) indicates the mean
square different of hˆ
′
and the expected value of hˆ [20].
Under supervised learning setting, VAR can be re-
garded as a measure of system overfitting. The larger
VAR, the more system prone to overfitting. However,
since these two values are computed with distinct user-
specific matrices, so they are incomparable. Thus,
VAR is approximately defined as
V AR ≈ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[D(h′i, hˆ
′
i)−D(h, hˆ)]2. (10)
To gain a decent attack performance (indicated by TEE),
both small TRE and VAR are expected [20].
In general, overfitting is determined by the two factors,
namely training data size and model complexity. As shown
in Fig. 1, in an ideal setting, the test accuracy increases with
respect to data size due to good generalization (no overfit-
ting) whereas the test accuracy will deteriorate when the
model complexity is overly high due to overfitting. In CSA
context, the model complexity is fixed as CSA model does
not have learnable parameters. The overfitting issue of the
CSA relies solely on IoM hash code size , L , which is
equivalent to training data size. Thus, the solution to al-
leviate the overfitting in the CSA is just to increase the L
.
Based on eq. 9, TRE is smaller when h and hˆ are closer.
Ideally, TRE = 0 when hˆ = h. The constrained opti-
mization model that we designed for CSA is based on the
algorithm-specific inequality or equality relations. The con-
straints are established to force hˆ be closer to or be (ideally)
identical to h. The details of the algorithm-specific con-
straints designed for IoM hashing are presented in section
3.4.
Figure 1. Performance related to dataset size and model complex-
ity under ideal conditions [21].
3.4. Inequality constraints of IoM hashing
In IoM hashing, each hash code is derived from the first
ranked index after projecting the biometric template onto
a random subspace [4]. This facilitates the construction of
the inequality relations, which can be exploited as the con-
straints for CSA. If the constraints are satisfied, the TRE is
equal to zero as hˆ = h.
Let zˆ = [zˆ1, zˆ2, ..., zˆK ] = R∗xˆ be the random projected
vector of preimage and hˆ be the first ranked index value of zˆ.
In the event of CSA, user-specific matrix R∗ and h are com-
promised. The attacker could leverage the clue hˆ = h to
minimize the hamming distance. Based on the knowledge
of R∗ and h , the inequality relations could be established
as
zˆh ≥ ∀zˆk ∈ zˆ, k = 1, ...,K. (11)
A constraint function c(·) can be defined based on eq. 11 as
c(xˆ) = {zˆk − zˆh|k = 1, ..,K}, where zˆk ∈ zˆ = R∗xˆ.
(12)
Thus, the inequality constraint is c(xˆ) ≤ 0. If the constraint
is unsatisfied, we name it as a violation. To quantify the
violation, a constraint violation function v(·) is devised as
follow:
v = max c(xˆ). (13)
In general, the constraint is met if v(·) ≤ τ , where τ ≈ 0,
or τ = 0 ideally.
3.5. Augmented Lagrangian Genetic Algorithm
The original SA is an unconstrained optimization prob-
lem based on eq. 7 to approximate xˆ, which is kind of ad-
hoc. GA is employed in GASA as a searching algorithm
[12]. In the traditional GA, the output is produced with a
repeated procedure of selection, mutation and crossover un-
til convergence (i.e. meeting stopping criteria). However,
traditional GA is limited to solve unconstrained optimiza-
tion problems [22]. In this paper. we adopt ALGA [23]
as a means of searching algorithm to solve xˆ based on the
constraints formulated in eq. 7 and eq. 12. ALGA is an
iterative 4-steps procedure (one generation) as follows:
Algorithm 1: Augmented Lagrangian Genetic Algo-
rithm
Input : Compromised template h and user-specific
R∗, loss function L(·), constraint function
c(·), constraint violation function v(·),
stopping criteria τ1, τ2
Output: Preimage xˆ
1 Initialization: Initial xˆ with random standard Gaussian
vector
2 repeat
3 Complete Lagrangian barrier function LB(·) by
combining L(·) and c(·) refer to [23]
4 Minimize LB(·) with GA
5 Estimate if stopping criteria is met
6 until |Ln−1(·)− Ln(·)| ≤ τ1 and v(·) ≤ τ2
• Step 1: Combine the loss function L(·) (eq. 7) and
constraint function c(·) (eq. 12) in terms of Lagrangian
barrier function LB(·). The goal is to transform a con-
strained to unconstrained problem, which is applicable
to GA. For the definition of Lagrangian barrier func-
tion and detailed combination algorithm please refer
to [23].
• Step 2: Minimize LB(·) with GA.
• Step 3: The optimization process will be terminated
when |Ln−1(·) − Ln(·)| ≤ τ1 and v(·) ≤ τ2 where
n is the generation number, τ1 and τ2 are the selected
tolerance where τ∗ ≈ 0, or τ∗ = 0, *=1, 2 ideally.
• Step 4: Go to Step 1 and update LB(·), if stopping
criteria is not satisfied. It indicates that the inequal-
ity constraint must be satisfied when ALGA converges,
while the constraint might not be satisfied at every gen-
eration.
A complete ALGA algorithm description can be found
at algorithm 1 [23].
4. Experiments
4.1. Dataset
LFW dataset [24] is used to evaluate the CSA on IoM
hashing. There are 5749 users in the entire LFW dataset.
The subjects with more than 10 images are chosen and the
first 10 images of each subject are selected for our experi-
ments. The subset of LFW dataset consists of 1580 images
which contains 158 users and 10 images for each user. The
face feature is extracted into a 512-dimensional vector by a
deep learning model, InsightFace [25].
4.2. Experiment protocol
The first sample of each subject is used to compute
preimage xˆ. The remaining nine samples of each subject
are used for verification. We adopt distinctive R∗ in our ex-
periments for pre-image generation and verification. This
aims to stimulate re-issue of protected template scenario
and evaluate the possibility of preimage to breach multi-
ple systems. The hash code size L varies from 8 to 512 is
examined and the preimage generation process under each
scenario of selected L is executed only once due to compu-
tational cost.
For attack performance assessment, we propose two new
metrics, namely successful attack rate (SAR) and false ac-
ceptance increment (FAI). SAR are recorded using accep-
tance rate of preimage xˆ. By excluding false acceptance rate
(FAR), FAI=SAR-FAR, indicates true attack performance.
A higher FAI implies a more effective attack performance.
In addition, equal error rate (EER) is computed to evalu-
ate the performance of IoM hashing with respect to L. All
performance assessments are repeatably executed ten times
with different R∗.
For efficiency evaluation, the number of generations and
computation cost in second are recorded when preimage
generation of one sample reaches convergence. The ma-
chine we used for simulation is equipped with MATLAB
Ver. 2019b, 2.7 GHz Dual-Core Intel Core i5 CPU and 1867
MHz 8GB RAM.
4.3. Experiment results
We first investigate the effect of L with respect to the
attack performance of CSA. For each L, threshold θ (for
the convenience of comparison, it is recorded as θ2), EER
and FAR of IoM hashing, SAR, FAI and TEE of GASA and
the proposed CSA are reported in Table 1. The results show
that when L ≤ 32, TEE of CSA is more than 0.83 and it
is considerably higher than θ2 (0.83 vs 0.71). This implies
CSA is not so effective against IoM hashing when hash code
size is small. However, this is not practical because small
hash code size is vulnerable to other security attacks such as
brute force attack. On the other hand, when L > 64, TEE
of CSA is perceivably reduced and FAI raises dramatically.
When L = 512, SAR of CSA achieved up to 99.19% and
FAI of CSA achieved 98.58%. To benchmark GASA, the
attack performance of CSA is close to GASA when L is
small (e.g. L ≤ 32). However, when L increases, TEE of
CSA reduces much faster than TEE of GASA. Along with
SAR and FAI, we can observe that CSA largely outperforms
GASA in terms of SAR (CSA: 99.19% vs GASA: 64.12%)
and FAI (CSA: 98.58% vs GASA: 63.51%).
The experiment results obtained above are indeed con-
sistent with the analysis in section 3. Figure 2 illustrates
the error trend of GASA and CSA. Specifically, when L is
small, it results high VAR due to overfitting (yellow curve)
Table 1. CSA performance with subspace dimensionK = 16.
Hash code
size (L)
IoM GASA Proposed CSA
θ2 EER(%) FAR(%) SAR(%) FAI(%) TEE SAR(%) FAI(%) TEE
8 0.7639 14.40 9.78 10.94 1.16 0.8537 11.06 1.28 0.8491
16 0.7639 8.59 9.44 12.41 2.97 0.8373 11.14 1.70 0.8491
32 0.7101 3.87 2.69 3.96 1.27 0.8338 4.83 2.14 0.8311
64 0.7351 2.00 2.24 5.40 3.16 0.8139 12.03 9.79 0.7740
128 0.7379 1.10 1.10 7.54 6.44 0.7823 42.13 41.03 0.6693
256 0.7455 0.72 0.71 24.11 23.39 0.7263 92.08 91.36 0.5023
512 0.7525 0.60 0.61 64.12 63.51 0.6482 99.19 98.58 0.2866
(a) GASA (b) CSA
Figure 2. Error of GASA and CSA with different hash code size L.
Table 2. CSA efficiency with subspace dimensionK = 16.
Hash code
size (L)
GASA Proposed CSA
Generations Time (s) Generations Time (s)
16 68 11.88 5 142.95
32 87 15.78 5 182.00
64 109 26.13 5 201.87
128 111 34.10 5 364.96
512 94 97.84 5 3661.63
(section 3.3). Despite TRE (blue curve) of both GASA and
CSA are low under this case, TEE (red curve) is still high.
This leads to poor attack performance. On the other hand,
when L increases, VAR for both GASA and CSA is re-
duced. The TRE of CSA remains at zero attributed to the
inequality constraints, yet TRE of GASA increases due to
the increment ofL. WhenL is large enough (e.g. L = 512),
the attack performance is mainly affected by TRE. With ad-
ditional constraints, TRE in CSA can be zero while this is
not the case for GASA. Therefore, we can point out that
CSA outperforms GASA when L is large enough.
To evaluate the efficiency of CSA, the number of gener-
ations and time for convergence in second for one preim-
age generation are recorded in Table 2. The results show
that the number of generations to convergence for CSA is
significantly lesser than that of GASA while the preimage
computational cost of CSA is comparably higher. This is
due to natural distinction of the traditional GA and ALGA,
where one generation produced by ALGA refers to a solu-
tion of each Lagrangian barrier function, and this process
likely consists of multiple generations produced by the tra-
ditional GA. The number of generations for ALGA is hence
less. Referring to section 3.5, ALGA consists of multiple
operations, e.g. Lagrangian barrier function LB(·) and GA
computation. The total operations of ALGA is much more
than just one single GA, hence more computational cost
is somehow expected. This demonstrates a phenomenon
where high preimage computational cost trades with a good
Table 3. CSA performance against Biohashing.
Hash code
size (L)
Biohashing GASA Proposed CSA
EER(%) FAR(%) SAR(%) FAI(%) SAR(%) FAI(%)
512 0.63 0.63 34.43 33.80 72.74 72.11
attack performance in CSA. Nevertheless, even approxi-
mately one hour (3661.63 seconds) for a successful attack
is feasible and worthwhile indeed.
We also conduct CSA on Biohashing by using LFW
face dataset. Table 3 reveals that CSA can largely out-
perform GASA on Biohashing as well in terms of SAR
(CSA: 72.74% vs GASA: 34.43%) and FAI (CSA: 72.11%
vs GASA: 33.80%). Therefore, CSA can applied to CB
which could apply equalities or inequalities as constraints.
As limited by the paper length, we will not address more
details about Biohashing.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel similarity-based attack
on IoM hashing known as CSA. The experiments conducted
under LFW face dataset show that CSA is effective in terms
of SAR and FAI against IoM hashing. The CSA demon-
strates a superior attack performance (SAR and FAI) over
GASA due to the employment of constrained optimization.
We further analyze that the constraints in CSA can signifi-
cantly reduce TRE whereas it is impossible for GASA. The
theoretical justification on CSA attack performance is con-
sistent with the empirical observations. We further reveal
that 1) the attack performance of the CSA is closely related
to the IoM hash code size; 2) the CSA trades the preim-
age computational cost with superior attack performance,
nonetheless, the average computational cost for L = 512
is approximately one hour, which is acceptable and worth-
while.
However, there are two limitations of CSA. Firstly, the
CSA relies on information leakage restrictively. This means
it requests the knowledge of the protected template, trans-
formation algorithm and its associated parameters (eq. 7).
Secondly, unlike GASA which requires no constraints, CSA
expects constraints to be established, which could be diffi-
cult for some cancellable biometric schemes such as Bloom
filter. However, CSA might outperform GASA if those con-
straints can be identified.
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